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Abstract Theories of truth can hardly avoid taking into account how truth is expressed
in natural language. Existing theories of truth have generally focused on true occurring
with that-clauses. This paper takes a closer look at predicates of truth (and related
notions) when they apply to objects as the referents of referential noun phrases. It
argues that truth predicates and their variants, predicates of correctness, satisfaction
and validity, do not apply to propositions (not even with that-clauses), but to a range
of attitudinal and modal objects, objects we refer to as ‘claims’, ‘beliefs’, ‘judgments’,
‘demands’, ‘promises, ‘obligations’ etc. As such natural language reflects a notion of
truth that is primarily a normative notion, which, however, is not action-guiding, but
rather constitutive of representational objects, independently of any actions that may
go along with them. The paper furthermore argues that the predicate true is part of a
larger class of satisfaction predicates whose semantic differences are best accounted
for in terms of a truthmaker theory along the lines of Fine’s (A companion to the
philosophy of language, Wiley, Chichester, 2017b) truthmaker semantics. Truthmaker
theory also provides a notion of partial content for attitudinal and modal objects, which
may exhibit partial correctness, partial satisfaction, and partial validity.








Natural language bears on a range of philosophical issues, and it fails to bear on
others. The notion of truth is certainly one on which natural language bears a lot.
Many theories of truth are focused on the way truth is conveyed in natural language,
on the syntactic status of true as a predicate, connective, operator, or other linguistic
‘device’, as well as on the sorts of object that true, if considered a predicate, applies
to, whether it is a proposition, an utterance, an act, or some other kind of object.
Theories of truth generally care about what sorts of expressions true goes along with,
that-clauses, referential NPs, quantifiers, or pronouns. Thus, a focus on true with that-
clauses has given rise to views according to which true does not act as a predicate
or express a property, but rather has the status of a connective or operator (Mulligan
2010), an anaphoric device (Grover et al. 1975), or a semantically empty predicate,
which may just serve the purpose of stating generalizations regarding propositional
contents using quantifiers or pronouns (Ramsey 1927; Horwich 1990; Künne 2003
among others). Clearly then, a closer look at the way the expression true actually
applies in natural language can be very important for the philosophical debate itself.
This paper argues that a closer look at both semantic and syntactic aspects of natural
language is very important for three issues regarding the notion of truth:
[1] the nature and range of truth bearers
[2] the relation of truth to normativity and the broader notion of satisfaction
[3] the actual semantics of truth predicates with that-clauses.
Whereas most work on the expression of truth focuses on true with that-clauses, this
paper focuses on true as a predicate that clearly applies to objects, as the referents of
referential noun phrases. Moreover, it focuses on the fact that there is not a single truth
predicate true, but a range of predicates that convey truth or a truth-related notion.
Truth-related predicates consist in predicates of correctness, of satisfaction, and of
validity.
Truth-related predicates, including true, are not predicates of a single sort of
object, say propositions. Rather in natural language they act as predicates of vari-
ous attitudinal objects. Attitudinal objects are, for example, entities that we refer to as
claims, judgments, beliefs, requests, promises, decisions, intentions, and desires. Even
though hardly recognized as such in contemporary metaphysics, attitudinal objects are
extremely well-reflected in natural language and display a range of common charac-
teristics which together distinguish them from other categories of objects, in particular
acts and propositions. Some attitudinal objects are mental states (beliefs, intentions,
desires), others are the non-enduring products of actions in the sense of Twardowski
(1911), for example judgments, decisions, claims, promises, and requests. Predicates
of satisfaction also apply to objects closely related to attitudinal objects, namely (deon-
tic) modal objects. Modal objects, which share relevant characteristics with attitudinal
objects, are entities like obligations, permissions, needs, and invitations, as well as
laws and rules. Both attitudinal and modal objects are part of the ontology of natural
language in the sense of Moltmann (2017b, to appear), namely as the ontology speak-
ers implicitly accept when using the language. That ontology may be different from
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the reflective ontology of speakers, the ontology philosophers or non-philosophers
may accept when thinking about what there is.
Correct conveys truth (and just truth) with a range of attitudinal objects, as a norm
associated with representational objects, rather than one that guides cognitive or illocu-
tionary acts (Jarvis 2012). The range of attitudinal objects with which correct conveys
truth, it turns out, is greater than the one that true can apply to (which shows a surpris-
ing discrepancy between the philosophical notion of truth and the semantic content of
the English expression true).
Predicates of satisfaction (satisfied, fulfilled, taken up, implemented, realized etc)
are on a par with truth predicates, applying to particular sorts of attitudinal and modal
objects. But different satisfaction predicates impose different conditions on attitudinal
and modal objects and their satisfiers, conditions that can best be formulated in terms
of a truthmaker approach along the lines of Fine (2017b, to appear a, b). Truthmaker
theory will also account for the part structure of attitudinal and modal objects, which
is based on partial content and underlies notions of partial truth, partial satisfaction,
and partial validity.
Not only truth predicates with referential noun phrases apply to attitudinal (and
modal) objects, but also truth predicates with that-clauses, which, the paper argues,
apply to a contextually given claim or suggestion, rather than, as is standardly assumed,
an abstract proposition.
With its focus on a greater class of truth bearers and truth-related predicates, the
paper, finally, will add new arguments against a deflationist or minimalist account of
truth predicates with that-clauses.
1.1 Propositions, attitudinal objects, and the core-periphery distinction
Philosophical theories of truth generally focus on true when it occurs with a that-clause
as in (1a):
(1) a. That Paris is the capital of France is true.
That-clauses are generally considered to be proposition-referring terms, which appears
supported by the apparent equivalence of (1a) and (1b):
(1) b. The proposition that Paris is the capital of France is true.
The focus of this paper is on true and other truth-related predicates when they occur
with referential NPs rather than that-clauses. This point of departure will lead to a
rejection of an analysis of (1a) as in (1b) and establish a different category of objects
than propositions as the primary bearers of truth-related predicates.
Of course, true applies to a referential NP in (1b) and this raises the question
whether it would not simply establish that true applies to propositions. However, there
are good reasons not to focus on sentences like (1b). It is significant that philosophers
arguing for propositions being truth bearers hardly appeal to sentences like (1b), but
rather to sentences with simple that-clauses as in (1a) (Sect. 7) (and similarly for
the role of propositions as the objects of attitudes). Why don’t sentences like (1b)
qualify for supporting propositions as objects playing a particular role in the semantics
of natural language, such as truth bearers? That is because such sentences do not
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belong to the relevant part of language, namely what one may call its core, the part
of language whose use does not require philosophical reflection, yet may reflect an
implicit philosophically relevant view. The proposition that S is a quasi-technical term
aiming to make explicit (and thus likely reifying) what that-clauses are supposed to
stand for.1 As a term that involves a certain amount of philosophical or linguistic
reflection, it belongs to what one may call the periphery of language, the part of
language that does presuppose such reflection.2
While the core-periphery distinction in this sense has hardly ever been made explicit,
it constitutes an implicit assumption that has guided the appeal to natural language
throughout the history of philosophy. That is, it constitutes an implicit assumption
on which natural language ontology as a philosophical practice throughout history
is based and without which the project of natural language ontology would not be
possible (Moltmann 2017b, to appear). The distinction is well-reflected in the choice
of examples philosophers use or refrain from using when arguing for a particular
ontological category. For example, Frege, when arguing for propositions and numbers
being objects, pointed at the apparent semantic function of that-clauses and at the
apparent number-referring function of terms like nine and the number of planets, terms
from the core of language. He did not appeal to terms like the proposition that S or
the number nine, which are reifying terms in the periphery of language and thus could
not make the point. Similarly, when philosophers debate whether natural language
involves reference to properties as abstract objects, they do not point at the existence
in English of terms like the property of being wise, which are terms in the periphery
of language, but rather at simple nominalizations such as wisdom, which belong the
core of language. While the core-periphery distinction certainly is in need of further
clarification, it is incontestable that it guides philosophers’ appeal to natural language
when arguing for an ontological category, and without it, descriptive metaphysics
could hardly be pursued.
Referential NPs that are clearly part of the core of language and go with the predicate
true include ordinary nominalizations of attitude verbs such as belief, judgment, and
claim:
(2) a. John’s belief that S is true.
b. John’s judgment that S is true.
c. John’s claim that S is true.
The standard, proposition-based view takes nouns like judgment and claim to be
ambiguous between standing for mental events or speech acts and standing for propo-
sitions (see, for example, Pustejovsky 1995; Thomson 2008). That assumption is meant
to account for the observation that such predicates allow on the one hand for content-
1 Other ‘reifying terms’ of this sort include the truth value true and the direction north, again terms no
philosopher would point to when arguing for truth values or directions being objects. Frege, of course, argued
for truth values being objects, but he did so on the basis of considerations of the meaning of sentences, not
on the basis of the availability of the term the truth value true in natural language. Frege’s motivations for
truth values being objects in fact did not come from what appears to be reflected in natural language, unlike
his motivations for numbers and propositions.
2 For the ontological distinction between core and periphery of language (which is quite distinct from the
Chomskian distinction of the same name) see Moltmann (2013a; 2017b, to appear).
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related predicates such as true (which could apply to propositions) and on the other
hand for predicates of concreteness, specifying, for example, a temporal duration or
causal relation. However, there are good reasons to consider such nouns univocal,
standing for entities of a third kind, what I call attitudinal objects (Moltmann 2003b,
2013a, c, 2014, 2017c). On reason is that they permit at once predicates concrete
objects and truth predicates3:
(3) a. John remembered his false judgment that S.
b. Mary overheard John’s true claim that S.
Another, more important reason is the applicability of various predicates (with a par-
ticular reading) to propositions, actions, and attitudinal objects. Beliefs, judgments,
and claims belong to a category of objects—the category of attitudinal objects—which
have a range of linguistically well-reflected characteristics that together distinguish
them both from propositions and from actions.
First, there are predicates of satisfaction that can apply to a request, a piece of
advice, or a promise, but could apply neither to an action nor a proposition (Ulrich
1976; Moltmann 2014, 2017c):
(4) a. John fulfilled the request.
b. ??? John fulfilled the act of requesting/a proposition.
(5) a. Joe followed the advice.
b. ??? Joe followed the act of advising/a proposition.
(6) a. John broke the promise.
b. ??? John broke the act of promising/a proposition.
The applicability of predicates of satisfaction makes particularly clear that nouns like
request, advice, promise etc. could not stand for acts or propositions: neither acts nor
propositions can be ‘fulfilled’, ‘satisfied’, ‘followed’, or ‘broken’, a point emphasized
by Ulrich (1976).
Attitudinal objects generally come with essential truth or satisfaction condi-
tions, and of different sorts, reflected in the applicability of different satisfaction
predicates.4 Those conditions involve conditions on the truthmakers/satisfiers (or
falsemakers/violators) of attitudinal objects and the setting of norms underlying the
direction of fit, conditions that make a separation of content and force unnecessary
(Sect. 3).
Second, attitudinal objects have a part structure based on partial content. This also
distinguishes them from states, on the standard understanding on which states have
temporal parts. A part of a belief, judgment, or assertion is a partial content, not the
temporal part of a state or act. That is the only way part of can be understood when
3 These are not ordinary cases of co-predication dealt with in the pertinent literature (Pustejovsky 1995,
Asher 2010). This literature focuses on conjunction of predicates of different sorts, allowing conjuncts to
apply to different developments of an underspecified entity referred to by the subject term. Compositionally
such an account would not be available in (3a, b), which requires a modifier to apply to the semantic value
of the noun and then the predicate to apply to the modifier-noun combination.
4 Not all attitudinal objects come with truth or satisfaction conditions. There are also ‘expressive’ attitudinal
objects, for example products of expressive illocutionary acts such as sighs and complaints.
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applied to a belief, judgment, or assertion.5 By contrast, part of does not really apply
to propositions, with a clear intuitive understanding.6 With propositions, it very much
depends on the theoretical conception of a proposition how part of is understood. If
propositions are conceived as structured propositions, then objects and properties will
be constituents of propositions, and hence parts of them. But not so if propositions
are conceived as sets of possible worlds or constructs from possible worlds, in which
case the notion of part may be construed as that of partial content (Yablo 2015) (or,
similarly, if propositions are conceived in terms of sets of truthmakers or satisfiers as
in Fine (2017b)).7
Finally, attitudinal objects enter similarity relations strictly on the basis of being the
same in content, provided they are of the same type (Moltmann 2014, 2017b). This is
reflected in the way the same as and partly the same as are understood below:
(7) a. John’s claim was the same as Mary’s.
b. John’s claim was partly the same as Mary’s.
(7a) can only state the sharing of content, not the sharing of a way of performing a
speech act. (7b) similarly can only be about the sharing of a partial content. This is
different for actions. For actions to be the same, they need to share features of their
performance; sharing of content is neither sufficient nor in fact necessary.
Thus, attitudinal objects have the following general characteristics:
[1] they have truth or satisfaction conditions
[2] they have a part structure based on partial content
[3] they enter similarity relations based on content only rather than shared features
of a performance.
These features together characterize attitudinal objects as an ontological category and
distinguish them from acts and propositions. They also distinguish them from states,
on a notion of a state on which a state has temporal parts and enters similarity relations
based on shared features of its temporal parts. States in that sense generally do not
come with satisfaction conditions.8
5 All part-related expressions, not just part of behave that way (most of, to some extent, partially etc.).
6 Part of also applies to what is described as a ‘content’, picking out a partial content:
(i) a. Part of the content of the sentence John came and Mary left is that John came.
b. Part of the content of the claim/the thought that John came and Mary left is that John came.
7 Note that the adverbial partly can apply to propositions clearly relating to a partial content, as seen in
(ia), as opposed to (ib) (which does not have a clear meaning):
(i) a.The proposition that John is incompetent is partly true.
b. Part of the proposition that John is incompetent is true.
However, partly does not directly relate to the part structure of the subject referent, but may relate to an
entity closely related to it, such as the content of a sentence, as in (iia), which is not equivalent to (iib):
(ii) a. The sentence John is incompetent is partly true.
b. Part of the sentence John is incompetent is true.
See Yablo (2015) for the observation and Moltmann (2017a) for an analysis.
8 The sortal state generally is used for states in that sense rather than for attitudinal objects of the sort of
beliefs, desires, or intentions.
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In addition to those content-related features, attitudinal objects, as mentioned, may
exhibit properties of concreteness. They may enter causal relations (content-based
mental causation) and have a limited lifespan, generally not lasting longer than the
acts that may have established them.
Attitudinal objects depend on a particular agent. Thus, John’s claim depends on John
and cannot be the claim of Mary. This raises the question how attitudinal objects would
allow for the sharing of content. One way in which content can be shared, obviously,
consists in two agents engaging in similar attitudinal objects. Another way consists
in two agents engaging in a kind of attitudinal object. Kinds of attitudinal objects are
equally well-reflected in natural language (Moltmann 2003b, 2013a). Whereas John’s
claim that S in (8a) stands for a particular attitudinal object, the claim that S in (8b)
stands for a kind of attitudinal object:
(8) a. John’s claim that S is true.
b. The claim that S is true/is widely believed/has never been made.
As (8b) illustrates, kinds of attitudinal objects exhibit representational properties just
like particular attitudinal objects; moreover they need not be instantiated.
While attitudinal objects are hardly recognized in contemporary metaphysics, they
are clearly part of the ontology of natural language (Moltmann 2003a, b, 2013a, 2014,
2017c). Natural language generally displays a wealth of (nontechnical) terms for atti-
tudinal objects, most importantly nominalizations of attitude verbs such as claim,
thought, judgment, decision, promise, offer, invitation, request, demand, suggestion,
desire, intention, belief, hope, fear, etc., which exhibit a stable semantic behavior
displaying the characteristic properties of attitudinal objects. The fact that attitudinal
objects are well-reflected in language does not mean that attitudinal objects themselves
are in any way language-dependent. They would exist whether or not a language has
terms standing for them. It is just that language displays them and their nature bet-
ter than our reflective ontology. Attitudinal objects divide into mental states (beliefs,
intentions, desires), cognitive products (decisions, judgments, thoughts), and illocu-
tionary products (claims, requests, promises), in roughly the sense of Twardowski’s
(1911) distinction between actions and products. According to that notion of a product,
a claim is the non enduring product of an act of claiming, a judgment the (nonphysical)
product of an act of judging, and a decision the (nonphysical) product of an act of
deciding. To use Thomasson’s (1999) term, the judgment is the ‘abstract artifact’ that
results from an act of judging, in Thomasson’s sense of ‘abstract’ as ‘lacking a physical
realization’ (Moltmann 2014, 2017c). As in the case of artifacts, it is the product, not
the act that is the carrier of representational and relevant normative properties. This is
very important for the notion of truth and truth-related notions. Attitudinal objects, not
actions that may have established them, are the bearers of truth or the related notion
of satisfaction.
To summarize, attitudinal objects are entities that are characterized by a range of
properties, and they are well-reflected in natural language, at least in English and other
European languages. They consist of mental states and the non-enduring products of




2 True and correct as truth predicates
2.1 Correctness and the norm of truth
An important observation is that the truth of attitudinal objects can also be conveyed
by correct (or right), which thus acts as a normative truth predicate:
(9) a. John’s belief that S is correct.
b. John’s judgment that S is correct.
c. John’s claim that S is correct.
In natural language, correct when applied to a belief or an assertion conveys just truth,
whether or not the belief or assertion is justified or warranted. This is an important
fact. Even if some philosophers such as Williamson (2000) impose further, epistemic
conditions on the correctness of beliefs or assertion, this could not influence the appli-
cation of correct in natural language.9 Correct simply cannot convey more than just
truth when applied to beliefs, judgments, and assertions.
Like true, correct can also be predicated of sentences:
(10) This sentence is correct.
When predicated of sentences, however, correct evaluates grammaticality rather than
truth. Here the more general normative meaning of correct is at play, where correct
holds of an object o just in case o fulfills the norm (or standard of correctness) that is
associated with o or that is relevant in the context. The norm associated with a syntactic
object is grammaticality rather than truth. Other kinds of norms are associated with
other types of objects that correct may apply to. A choreography may be the norm for
a dancer’s movement as in (11a), a logic that for a proof as in (11b) and (11c), and
laws or moral values for punishments as in (11d):
(11) a. The dancer’s movements were correct.
b. The proof was correct.10
c. The conclusion that Mary is guilty is correct.
d. John’s punishment was correct.
For the application of correct, as for other truth-related predicates, the distinction
between actions and their products is important. When a conclusion is correct, the act
of concluding itself need not be; it may go against a contextually given demand—just
9 Thomson (2008) argues that correct applies to assertions in two different ways, depending on the meaning
of assertion. When assertion stands for a proposition, correct conveys external correctness, such as truth;
when assertion stands for an act of asserting, it conveys internal correctness, correct pronounciation, or use
of a grammatical sentence for example. I do not think this is reflected in the linguistic intuitions. Thomson
relies on the standard view according to which assertion is polysemous. But that view, as we have seen, is
problematic.
10 One may argue that proofs are correct by nature. Assertions and questions about the existence of a proof
of a hypothesis seem to presuppose that. However, proof is in fact also used as a noun for something that
may or may not be correct (the proof he wrote down turned out to be incorrect, it contained a mistake). Of
course, the verb prove is factive: John proved that S implies the truth of S -- as well as the existence of a
(correct) proof. But the verb is not the noun and the noun appears to be polysemous, able to also stand for
‘real’ as well as ‘potential’ or attempted proofs. See also Löf (1987).
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like a signature may be correct, but not the act of signing. This also holds for assertions
and judgments. When (9c) is true, (12a) need not be, and vice versa, and similarly for
(9b) and (12b):
(12) a. John’s making a claim that S/John’s claiming (that S) was correct.
b. John’s making a judgment (that S) is correct.11
Correct in (9a, b, c) conveys truth; in (12a, b) it conveys the fulfillment of what may
just be a contextually given norm, a requirement, expectation, instruction, or purpose.
Acts of making an assertion or a judgment or adopting or maintaining a belief may
be correct because they follow an instruction or order, not because they capture or
maintain a truth. Assertions, judgements, and beliefs, by contrast, are not evaluated as
correct according to some contextually relevant norm, but only according to the norm
they are intrinsically associated with, the norm of truth. Acts of judging and asserting
may produce a product that is associated with the norm of truth, quite independently
of what norms the acts themselves may aim to satisfy.12
In the philosophical literature, normativity is generally linked to actions. Thus,
there are proposals according to which truth is constitutive of the norm associated
with believing, along the lines of ‘if one ought to believe p, then p′ (Boghossian
2003; Gibbard 2005). But such conditions on adopting or maintaining a belief are
problematic (Glüer and Wikforss 2009). Truth is not the aim of believing in the sense
in which the fulfillment of moral values is what certain types of actions and decisions
should aim for. In fact, the norms for actions of adopting or maintaining a belief may
simply be contextually given norms of some sort or another. Truth as a norm is not
action-guiding, but rather is solely associated with the representational object, as its
purpose or ‘telos’, as Jarvis (2012) puts it. As a teleological norm, truth is associated
with mental states like beliefs as well as products of mental or illocutionary acts such
as judgments and assertions. Mental states such as beliefs and intentions need not have
been produced at all by any mental acts aiming at anything. In fact, intentions as states
arguably are prior to any intentional acts (Searle 1983).
To summarize, then, correct applies to an object with a single reading just in case
the object is intrinsically associated with a particular norm. Correct applies to beliefs,
judgments, and claims with a single reading conveying truth because beliefs, judg-
ments, and claims are intrinsically associated with the norm of truth. This association
11 It was pointed out to me that judging is not really a voluntary action, which means that a judging cannot
be correct in the way a claiming can. However, one can refrain from making a judgment, and thus the
making of a judgment can be correct.
12 Thomson (2008) argues against truth being normative and correct conveying normativity. Rather, for
her, correct applies relative to a kind that fixes the standard that an object of that kind has to meet in
order to count as correct. This is entirely in the spirit of the present account on which truth is the standard
associated with a certain kind of attitudinal object, which an attitudinal object of that kind needs to meet if
it is to count as correct. Unlike the present view, Thomason does not take contextually given standards into
consideration. Rather she takes the norms or standards associated with acts (of asserting) to be standards
of ‘internal correctness’.
For Thomson, assertions are associated with external and with internal standards of correctness, and truth
is just one (external) standard that assertions are associated with. That is because on her view assertion
is ambiguous between denoting a proposition (associated with an external standard of correctness) and
denoting an action (associated with an internal standard of correctness), a view that I take to be in error
(Sect. 1). See also Fn 9.
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is quite different from the contextually given norms that actions of judging or claiming
as well as actions of adopting or maintaining a belief are associated with.
Conveying truth (and only truth) with beliefs, judgments, and assertions does not
seem to be a peculiarity of English correct. Other normative predicates in English do
as well, for example right and, for falsehood, wrong, as do corresponding predicates
in other European languages.13 German stimmen, for example, is a predicate that
expresses a more restricted notion of correctness, relating to norms of the sort of
prescriptions and rules, but not moral values, as seen in (13a); yet it conveys truth (and
only truth) with assertions and suppositions, as in (13b) (Moltmann 2015a):
(13) a. Der Tanzschritt/??? Die Bestrafung stimmt.
‘The dance step/The punishment is correct’
b. Die Aussage/Die Annahme stimmt.
‘The claim/The supposition is correct’.
The fact that two linguistically unrelated predicates convey truth for the very same
range of objects (truth-directed attitudinal objects) suggests that it may be a crosslin-
guistic universal that predicates of correctness convey truth and just truth when applied
to attitudinal objects like beliefs, judgments, and claims, a speculation that of course
awaits further crosslinguistic research.
Propositions hardly allow for the application of correct, in marked contrast to beliefs
and assertions14,15:
(14) ??? The proposition that Mary left is correct.
If propositions are reified meanings of sentences, their ability to be truth bearers should
be derivative and not due to the truth norm that is constitutive of the intentionality
of beliefs and products of acts of judging and claiming. The predicate true differs
13 Sometimes a language displays only the normative predicate and no specific truth predicate. Thus,
German has only falsch, the antonym of richtig ‘correct’, conveying mere falsehood with claims and
beliefs, but, for example, failure to follow the choreography with dance movements (Moltmann 2015a).
Interestingly, falsch when predicated of sentences as in (ia) is not ambiguous, but means only ‘false’,
not ‘grammatically wrong’. To convey ungrammatically requires explicitly negating korrekt or richtig:
(i) a. Der Satz ist falsch.
‘The sentence is false.’
b. Der Satz ist nicht richtig/nicht korrekt/inkorrekt.
‘The sentence is not right/not correct/incorrect.’
14 There are other cases where true is appropriate, but not correct:
(i) a. The story the children were told is true.
b. ?? The story the children were told is correct.
These seem to be cases where truth is secondary for the purpose or telos of the representational object,
that is, where truth does not act as a norm associated with the representational object.
15 Propositions as truth bearers are sometimes considered on a par with entities like theories and dogmas.
However, unlike propositions, theories and dogmas are artifacts that have been established at a particular
time or time period. Whereas theories are generally dependent on a particular agent, dogmas involve a
generic dependency (see Thomasson 1999 for the notion of artifacts dependent on generic agency). Unlike
particular attitudinal objects, theories and dogmas have the status of enduring and shared contents, because
of the range of causal chains and physical realizations they involve. Theories and dogmas can be ‘true’ as
well as ‘correct’, like truth-directed attitudinal objects and unlike propositions.
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from correct in conveying a representation-related notion that can apply to sentences
and abstract propositions. This notion may then be accounted for in terms of the
primary notion of truth that is part of the notion of correctness. Roughly, true will
hold of a proposition or sentence in virtue of that proposition or sentence being able
to characterize a (potential) belief or claim that fulfills its norm.16
2.2 Correctness and the reflective notion of truth
There is another important point that the actual semantic behavior of correct makes.
With a range of attitudinal objects only correct is applicable, not true, even if those
attitudinal objects would be regarded as truth bearers, given our reflective (and not just
philosophical) notion of truth, that is, the notion speakers adopt upon reflection, not
the notion they implicitly adopt when using natural language. The judgments are less
sharp in English, though, than they are in other European languages, such as German,
French, and Italian.
First, attitudinal objects with a merely speculative force allow for correct, but
generally resist true, for at least a range of English speakers:
(15) a. John’s guess that Mary is won is correct.
b. ?? John’s guess that Mary won is true.
(16) a. The suspicion that Mary is guilty is correct.
b. ?? The suspicion that Mary is guilty is true.
(17) a. The speculation/conjecture that Mary is guilty was correct.
b. ?? The speculation/conjecture that Mary is guilty was true.
(18) a. The calculation that Mary would be home by then was correct.
b. ?? The calculation that Mary would be home by then was true.
Corresponding judgments from other European languages (such as French, Italian, and
German) are considerably sharper. Thus, in German, wahr (‘true’) is clearly excluded
from speculative attitudinal objects, just as vrai and vero are in French and Italian
respectively. This is illustrated below by the German, French and Italian translations
of (15a, b) and (16a, b):
(19) a. Die Vermutung, daß Maria gewonnen hat, ist richtig/??? wahr.
b. L’hypothèse que Marie ait vaincu est correcte/??? vraie.
c. La supposizione que Maria abbia vinto è corretta/??? vera.
(20) a. Der Verdacht, daß Maria schuldig ist, ist richtig/??? wahr.
b’. Le soupçon que Marie soit culpable est correct/??? vrai.
c. Il sospetto que Maria sia culpabile è corretto/??? vero.
Also future-oriented attitudinal objects do not easily accept true as a predicate, but
are better with the predicate correct. Again, the data are stronger in German than in
English17:
16 Note that the belief or claim may just be a kind and thus lack actual instances.
17 Predictions, though, can ‘become’ true:
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(21) a. Die Vorhersage, daß es gestern regnen würde, war richtig.
‘The prediction that it would rain yesterday was correct.’
b. ??? Die Vorhersage, daß es gestern regnen würde, war wahr.
‘The prediction that it would rain yesterday was true.’
Furthermore, cognitive products that result from perception do not allow for true,
and here the judgments are as sharp in English (22, 23) as they are in German in (24):
(22) a. Mary’s impression was correct.
b. ??? Mary’s impression was true.
(23) a. Mary’s observation that it is raining S is correct.
b. ??? Mary’s observation that it is raining is true.
(24) a. Marias Eindruck ist korrekt/??? wahr.
‘Mary’s impression is correct/true.’
b. Marias Beobachtung, daß es regnet, ist richtig/??? wahr.
‘The observation that it is raining is correct/true.’
Recollections may be viewed on a par with products of perception, namely as products
of introspection. They also do not accept true, but only correct, and that in English
and German:
(25) a. ??? Mary’s recollection that it had rained on her birthday a year ago is true.
b. Mary’s recollection that it had rained on her birthday a year ago is correct.
(26) Marias Erinnerung ist richtig/?? wahr.
‘Mary’s recollection is correct/true.’
Footnote 17 continued
(i) The prediction that it would rain yesterday had become true.
Even when speaking about a prediction in the past, had become true or turned out to be true are
appropriate, not, was true. Future-oriented attitudinal objects thus change over time as regards their ability
to bear truth, though not as regards their ability to bear correctness. A prediction is correct just in case it
is true at some point in the future. This suggests that the norm associated with correctness applied to an
attitudinal object at a time t is truth at some time, rather than truth at t.
Interestingly, as a referee has pointed out, true may sound better with prediction when acting as a noun
modifier, as in a true prediction. The reason for that may be that the adjective here is part of a reduced
relative clause, derived from something like prediction that has become true.
This also seems to hold for some speculative attitudinal objects. Thus German Hypothese ‘hypothesis’
does not really accept ist wahr ‘is true’ as predicate, but for some speakers is acceptable with wahr as a
modifier:
(ii) a. ??? Die Hypothese ist wahr.
‘The hypothesis is true.’
b. eine wahre Hypothese
‘a true hypothesis’
Hypothese also accepts hat sich als wahr herausegestellt ‘turned out to be true’:
(iii) Die Hypothese hat sich als wahr herausgestellt.




Correct rather than true also applies to truth bearers like explanations and answers,
which require particular presuppositions to be fulfilled, as in (27a) and (28a). Again
the judgments are somewhat sharper for the German translations in (27b) and (28b):
(27) a. The explanation that Mary was not informed was correct/?? true.
b. Die Erklärung, daß Maria nicht informiert war, war richtig/??? wahr.
(28) a. The answer that Paris is the capital of France is correct/? true.
b. Die Antwort, daß Paris die Hauptstadt von Frankreich ist, ist richtig/??? wahr.
For an explanation to be a correct or incorrect explanation, it does not suffice for
its content to be true; the explanation also needs to explain what is to be explained.
Similarly, an answer needs to respond to the question for it to be correct or incorrect.
True unlike correct thus requires an intentionally maintained or produced attitu-
dinal object that has a certain strength of truth-directed force and that need not to
respond to another attitudinal object (in terms of explanation or answerhood). True
thus carries a significant presupposition that correct lacks. True then does not actually
convey the reflective or philosophical notion of truth. That is, true does not convey
the notion of truth of ordinary speakers or philosophers when they reflect upon that
notion. Rather true conveys a notion of truth that speakers implicitly accept when
they use the language. Only correct conveys the reflective or philosophical notion of
truth, and only when applied to objects intrinsically associated with the norm of truth,
attitudinal objects ranging from beliefs and assertions to speculations, suggestions,
and impressions.
There is thus a discrepancy between a philosophical or reflective notion of truth and
the notion conveyed by the corresponding natural language expression. There are other
cases of such a discrepancy between a notion that speakers may adopt upon reflection
and a notion conveyed by the corresponding natural language expression. The notion
of existence is such a case. The notion of existence in contemporary philosophy is
generally considered a univocal concept that trivially applies to all actual entities of
whatever sort, whether existence is conceived of as existential quantification or as a
property. By contrast, the predicate exist in English (and it is syntactically a predicate)
applies only to (actual) enduring and abstract objects. Exist in particular fails to apply to
events (which rather ‘happen’, ‘take place’, or ‘occur’) (Hacker 1982; Cresswell 1986;
Moltmann 2013c). This holds not only for ordinary speakers, but also for philosophers
when they use English, whatever their metaphysical views about existence may be.
The philosophical or reflective notion of existence (the one that a philosopher or even
nonphilosopher may adopt upon reflection) thus diverges from the one that is part of
the semantics or rather the metaphysics of natural language.
Discrepancies of this sort require acknowledging two layers of judgements: that
of linguistically reflected intuitions and that arising from a shared philosophical or
reflective notion. Both types of judgment belong to the subject matter of descriptive
metaphysics in Strawson’s (1959) sense.18 Only the former, however, belong to the
subject matter of natural language ontology in the sense of Moltmann (2017b). The




latter belong to the branch of metaphysics whose subject matter is common sense
judgments that speakers would explicitly endorse and that may be part of their shared,
perhaps naïve, metaphysical reflections.
3 Predicates of satisfaction
3.1 Truth conditions versus satisfaction conditions and the notion of direction
of fit
Truth is part of another more general notion, namely satisfaction. Various types of
attitudinal objects do not have truth conditions, but rather satisfaction conditions, or
in fact satisfaction and violation conditions.19 Satisfaction (and violation) conditions
in turn divide into different sorts, expressed by different natural language predicates.
Thus, illocutionary products that are requests, demands, promises, pieces of advice,
or permissions cannot be said to be ‘true’.20 But they can be ‘satisfied’, ‘fulfilled’,
‘complied with’, ‘kept’, ‘followed’, or ‘taken up’. Moreover, a demand or a promise
cannot be ‘false’. A demand would rather be ‘ignored’ or ‘contravened’ and a promise
‘broken’. Similarly, cognitive products like decisions cannot be said to be ‘true’, but
rather would perhaps be ‘implemented’ or ‘executed’. Finally, mental states such as
desires and intentions could not be said to be ‘true’, but they can be ‘fulfilled’ or
‘realized’.
What is special about all these attitudinal objects is that they come with what Searle
(1969, 1983) calls a ‘world-word/mind-direction of fit’, rather than a ‘word/mind-
world direction of fit’. They require the world to fit the representation, rather than the
representation to fit the world.
The notion of direction of fit is generally used as an intuitive notion and as such
applies to illocutionary products (or speech acts) such as assertions and requests rather
straightforwardly. However, its application to mental products and states such as hopes
and fears is less straightforward and requires a clarification of the notion. I will come
back to that later.
In its application to illocutionary products, the direction of fit is a normative notion
whose normativity is reflected in attributions of correctness in the following way. An
illocutionary product with a word-world direction of fit is correct in case there is a part
of the world that makes it true. An action performed in recognition of an illocutionary
product with a world-word direction is correct in case it satisfies the illocutionary
product.21 A word-world direction of fit means that the illocutionary product itself
needs to fulfil a norm. Illocutionary products with a world-word/mind direction of fit
19 In intuitionism, truth is in fact replaced by (or explained in terms of) satisfaction. Thus, rather than taking
propositions to consist in truth conditions, they are taken to consist in an expectation or intention that is to
be fulfilled by a proof (or evidence) (Heyting) or else in a problem or task to be resolved by a proof (or
evidence) (Kolmogorov) (Löf 1987, p. 410).
20 A promise, of course, can be said to be a true promise or a false promise, but only in the sense of being
made sincerely, not in the sense of being fulfilled.
21
‘In recognition of’ is meant to capture Searle’s (1983) point that only actions by way of satisfying a
request or intention can satisfy the request or intention.
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come, by contrast, with an action-guiding norm or purpose. This is made more explicit
below:
(29) Characterization of direction of fit applied to illocutionary products
i. An illocutionary product o has a word-world direction of fit just in case o
satisfies its intrinsic norm (is correct) in a world w iff w makes o true.
ii. An illocutionary product o has a world-word direction of fit just in case
any action a performed in recognition of o satisfies the norm imposed by o
(is correct) in a world w iff a is part of w and satisfies o.
Correct fails to convey satisfaction when applied to attitudinal objects that come
with a world-word direction of fit. A request cannot be ‘correct’ (in the sense of being
satisfied), though it can be ‘correctly satisfied’.22,23 This should be attributed to the
particular normative nature of a world-word direction of fit, which imposes a norm
on actions performed in recognition of the representational object, but not on the
representational object itself, in contrast to a word-world direction of fit.
Satisfaction conditions go along best with a truthmaker approach along the lines of
Fine (2017b, to appear a, b). This means that not entire worlds stand in the satisfaction
relation to a request, promise, intention, or decision, but rather relevant parts of the
world, in particular actions. Actions as satisfiers of a request, promise, intention, or
decision are entities that are wholly relevant for the satisfaction of the request, promise,
intention, or decision. They are exact satisfiers of the request, promise, intention,
or decision. Some attitudinal objects, for example requests or promises, also have
(exact) violators, actions in virtue of which the attitudinal object fails to be satisfied.
For products of directive illocutionary acts, satisfaction (or violation) may also be
conveyed by agentive verbs, with the by-locution describing a particular action as the
satisfier (or violator) of the attitudinal object:
(30) a. John fulfilled the demand by handing in the paper in time.
b. John followed/ignored the request by staying home.
The truthmaker approach also applies to truth-directed attitudinal objects such as
beliefs, judgments, and claims. That means that a situation will be the (exact) truth-
maker of a belief, judgment, or claim just in case it is wholly relevant for the truth of
the belief, judgment, or claim.
In Fine’s (2017b, to appear a, b) truthmaker semantics, the notions of exact truth-
making or satisfaction and of falsemaking or violation play a central role, though
applied to declarative and imperative sentences. The very same notions, however, can
be applied also to attitudinal objects.24 Truthmaker semantics provides a notion of
22 Jarvis (2012) mistakenly takes correctness to also apply to conative mental states such as intentions,
pointing to the possibility of an intention being ‘correctly realized’. But in correctly realized, correctly
applies to the action that aims to realize the intention, not the intention, the mental state, itself.
23 The fact that correct evaluates actions that aim to satisfy a request or obligation, but cannot convey the
fulfillment of the request or obligation is not only a conceptual truth about the direction of fit associated
with satisfaction, but also a linguistic universal. The very same holds for normative predicates such as right,
wrong, and German stimmen.
24 A rudimentary truthmaker view of intentionality (that is, not involving sentences, but mental states and
cognitive and illocutionary acts) can also be found in Searle (1983). For the notion of a truthmaker see also
Mulligan et al. (1984).
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content and of partial content, construed in terms of exact truthmaking or satisfaction
(Fine 2017b, to appear a, b) Also those notions can be carried over straightforwardly
to attitudinal objects (Sect. 5).
There are various motivations for truthmaker semantics, as opposed to possible-
worlds semantics (Fine 2017b, to appear a, b). They include the interest in having
a notion of partial content, a notion that also applies to attitudinal objects (Sect. 5).
The semantic differences among satisfaction predicates and the notions they involve
provide new motivations for truthmaker theory, now applied to attitudinal objects.
Also the notion of a direction of fit goes along best with a truthmaker approach, by
imposing norms on actions, not entire worlds.
3.2 Modal objects and their satisfaction conditions
There is another type of object besides attitudinal objects that displays satisfaction
conditions. These are what I call (deontic) modal objects.25 Modal objects (of the
deontic sort) are entities like obligations, needs, permissions, offers, and invitations.
They are the entities that correspond to deontic modals and would be described by
nominalizations of deontic modal predicates. But deontic modal objects also include
(abstract) artifacts like laws and rules, which are independent of the availability of
nominalizations in particular languages. Modal objects share the characteristics of
attitudinal objects, characteristics that distinguish them from entities such as states,
actions, and propositions. That is, modal objects enter similarity relations based on
sameness of content (John’s obligation being the same as Mary’s means they are the
same in content); they have a part structure strictly based on partial content (part of
John’s obligation can only be a partial content, not a temporal part of a state or event or
a structural part of a proposition), and, most importantly, deontic modal objects have
satisfaction conditions. Thus, an obligation or commitment may be satisfied, fulfilled,
or complied with, and an offer or invitation taken up or accepted. Modal objects may
be produced by the very same acts that produce illocutionary products, such as acts
of requesting, promising, and permitting. But unlike illocutionary products, modal
objects can last beyond the illocutionary act that may have established them. Thus, if
Joe, being in a relevant position of power, asks Mary to work fulltime, then not only
a request for Mary to work fulltime results, but also (under the right circumstances)
an obligation for her to work fulltime, and that obligation may last way past the time
of the request. A modal object produced by an illocutionary act shares its satisfaction
conditions with the illocutionary product that the same act produces, but it generally
has a different lifespan.26 Deontic modal objects have a world-word/mind direction
of fit. That is, they can be satisfied (or violated) only by actions and impose a norm of
correctness or legitimateness on actions.
25 There are other modal objects which I will set aside, such as epistemic modal objects (certainties,
possibilities), abilities, and essences. See Moltmann (2017c) for discussion.
26 Some nouns are polysemous, standing for an illocutionary product or a modal object, for example
permission, offer, and invitation.
123
Synthese
Not all attitudinal and modal objects that have satisfaction rather than truth condi-
tions go along with the predicates be satisfied or be fulfilled. Attitudinal and modal
objects can be ‘satisfied’ or ‘fulfilled’ only if their modal force is that of necessity
rather than possibility. Attitudinal and modal objects with the modal force of possi-
bility such as proposals, permissions, offers, and invitations cannot be ‘satisfied’ or
‘fulfilled’. Instead, a proposal, a permission, and an offer may be ‘taken up’ and an
invitation ‘accepted’.
Also actions of satisfying permissions, offers, and invitations are evaluated dif-
ferently from the satisfiers of requests and obligations. An action of taking up a
permission, offer, or invitation is ‘legitimate’, whereas an action of satisfying a request
or obligation is ‘correct’.
What distinguishes proposals, permissions, offers, and invitations from requests
and obligations is that they cannot be violated. Not taking up an offer or accepting
an invitation is not a violation, but not satisfying a demand or fulfilling a promise
is. Moreover, whatever action is performed in virtue of which the demand or request
fails to be satisfied, that action is a violator of the request or demand. Attitudinal and
modal objects of possibility may have ‘satisfiers’, as I (misleadingly) call them, but
they cannot have violators (Moltmann 2015b, 2017c).
This difference is reflected not only in the different satisfaction predicates applicable
to the two sorts of attitudinal and modal objects. It is also reflected in the absence of any
predicates of violation applicable to permissions, offers, and requests. Obligations can
be violated or contravened, and rules or laws can be broken. Offers and invitations can
be declined or refused, but that does not amount to a violation. The predicate ignore
conveys violation with modal objects of necessity, but with modal objects of possibility
it conveys simply failure to satisfy such an object. Ignoring a permission does not
mean violating it, but ignoring a command or request means that. The difference in
modal force is also reflected in the way satisfiers are evaluated. An action of taking
up a permission would not be ‘correct’, but ‘legitimate’. Note that by having only
satisfiers and no violators, attitudinal and modal objects of possibility can only bear
the equivalent of truth (that is, satisfaction), not that of falsehood.
This difference between modal objects of necessity and of possibility means that
modal objects like requests, commands, commitments, and obligations have as their
content both a set of actions that are satisfiers and a set of actions that are violators,
whereas modal objects like invitations, permissions, and offers have only a set of
satisfiers. More accurately, modal objects of necessity should be assigned as their
content a pair consisting of a non-empty set of possible satisfiers and of a non-empty
set of possible violators, whereas modal objects of possibility a pair consisting of a
nonempty set of possible satisfiers and an empty set of possible violators.
3.3 World-word/mind direction of fit for attitudinal objects without actions
as satisfiers
There are cases where appeal to the direction of fit is not straightforward and thus
cannot immediately explain the choice of the satisfaction predicate. For example,
nonfactive attitudinal objects associated with a positive emotion or preference (hopes,
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desires) do not have truth conditions, but fulfillment conditions. Hopes and desires
cannot be said to be true or false, but they can be fulfilled or unfulfilled27:
(31) John’s hope/desire that he would win yesterday was fulfilled.
Why do hopes and desires have satisfaction conditions rather than truth conditions?
Certainly hopes and desires do not always require actions to satisfy them, unlike
requests and commands.
Does this mean that they have a word-word/mind direction of fit? If so, there would
not be a correlation of the two directions of fit with satisfaction conditions versus truth
conditions.
One might suggest that instead of the direction of fit, it is the future-orientedness
of hopes and desires that makes predicates like be satisfied or be fulfilled available.28
However, fears, which tend to be equally future-oriented, do not accept be fulfilled,
and neither does future-oriented believe:
(32) a. ??? John’s fear that he would lose was fulfilled.
b. ??? John’s belief that he would win was fulfilled.
There is a better explanation why positive emotive attitudes go with be fulfilled
rather than be true having to do with what actually sets up a direction of fit. Positive
emotive attitudinal objects like hopes and desires imply a positive emotive response
to their satisfaction (under normal circumstances), and reaching that positive response
requires for a part of the world to make such attitudinal objects true, rather than the
attitudinal object aiming to represent the world. The positive emotive response that
a hope is directed toward constitutes a kind of norm or purpose and as such imposes
a requirement on the world, rather being subject to a requirement itself. By contrast,
a merely doxastic attitudinal object such as a belief has as its norm or purpose the
accuracy of the representation only and that imposes a requirement on the belief
rather than on the world. Thus, hopes and desires, even though they do not require
27 This holds at least if they are they are future-oriented, rather than directed to the past as below:
(i) ??? John’s hope that his wife was not his cousin has fulfilled itself.
Interestingly, a future-oriented hope can ‘become true’, though a present-oriented hope can neither ‘be
true’ nor ‘become true’:
(ii) a. John’s hope that he would win became true.
b. John’s hope that the key had remained in the lock was fulfilled/??? was true/??? became true.
By contrast, predictions, which can only be future-oriented, can always be fulfilled or become true
(though, again, they could not ‘be true’). See Fn 13. This means that become true does not relate to
epistemic uncertainty regarding the present or past, but metaphysical indeterminacy of the future.
28 There is a common characteristic of attitudinal objects with a world-word/mind direction of fit and
future-oriented attitudinal objects, given an open, branching future. That is that at the time at which those
attitudinal and modals objects exist, there will be different actions or states of affairs in different future stages
of the (actual) world that would satisfy the attitudinal object. This is not the case for past or present-directed
attitudinal objects (beliefs, claims, hopes) not even for those that could have several truthmaking states of
affairs. Given truthmaker semantics, disjunctive or existentially quantified beliefs may have several states
of affairs that make them (actually) true. Thus, John’s disjunctive belief that Joe invited Mary or Bill would
be made true both by an actual situation of Joe’s inviting Mary and an actual situation of Joe’s inviting
Bill. These two situations would also both make true Bill’s existentially quantified belief that Joe invited
someone. The two situations, however, would be part of the same current or past stage of the world.
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actions to be their satisfiers, involve a world-word/mind direction of fit, rather than
the word/mind-world direction of fit of merely doxastic attitudinal objects.
3.4 Satisfaction conditions for intentions and decisions
Attitudinal objects such as intentions and decisions are generally taken to involve
a world-word/mind direction of fit. But the satisfaction of intentions and decisions
is not conveyed by predicates like is satisfied or is fulfilled. Rather decisions are
‘implemented’ or ‘executed’ and intentions ‘realized’. What distinguishes requests
and orders from intentions and decisions is the normative aspect that goes along with
the former, but not the latter. Requests and orders impose a kind of social norm on
actions performed in recognition of them, in the sense that they impose a norm or
purpose on another person’s actions. This is not so for decisions and intentions: not
realizing a decision or intention does not violate a norm imposed by someone else, but
simply frustrates the aim of one’s own intention or decision. Social norms are imposed
only when an addressee is involved in the satisfaction of the attitudinal object. Requests
can be ‘fulfilled’ because here one agent (the speaker) sets up a teleological norm to be
fulfilled by another (the addressee). Promises can be ‘fulfilled’ because with a promise
a speaker declares and thus shares with the addressee a norm that her actions will be
subject to.29
To summarize, the semantic differences among satisfaction predicates reflect the
presence or absence of violators as well as differences in the sorts of teleological norms
imposed on the (exact) satisfiers of attitudinal objects. These semantic differences
could not be formulated if attitudinal and modal objects were just assigned a set of
worlds as their content. Rather they support a truthmaker approach to the content of
attitudinal and modal objects.
4 Predicates of validity
Deontic modal objects like obligations, permissions, offers, as well as rules and laws
have another truth-related dimension, namely validity. Predicates of validity include
is valid, obtain, and hold. Validity is linked to existence, but also to truth.
Validity is the way of existence, the mode of being, of deontic modal objects. Thus,
the validity of a modal object (at a time) amounts to the existence of the modal object
(at the time)30:
(33) a. The obligation for Mary to work still holds.
b. The permission/offer for Mary to use the house is still valid.
But validity is also linked to truth. Thus, the validity of a modal object amounts to the
time-relative truth of the corresponding modal sentence or, equivalently, the truth of
29 Of course one can promise something to oneself. In that case, the agent acts in two roles, as receiver of
the declared norm and the agent to fulfill it.
30 Validity in a way is also the mode of being of ‘real’ proofs: a proof is ‘real’ just in case it is valid. As




the corresponding tensed modal sentence. Thus (33a) is, roughly, equivalent to (34a)
and (34b), and (33b) to (35a) and (35b)31:
(34) a. That Mary still has to work is true.
b. That Mary has to work is still true.
(35) a. That Mary may still use the house is true.
b. That Mary may use the house is still true.
For modal objects that are laws, rules, and or conditions the same holds for the predicate
obtain:
(36) a. The law that one must have a passport still obtains.
b. That one must have a passport is still true.
Validity is linked not only to existence (as the mode of being of deontic modal objects)
and to truth (of the corresponding modal sentence). It is also linked to satisfaction: only
modal objects that have satisfaction conditions can have validity. There is moreover
a close connection between validity and correctness: if a modal object (of necessity)
is valid, then actions satisfying it are correct.32 The validity of a modal object thus
imposes an action-guiding norm on its satisfiers. Validity, unlike truth for truth-directed
attitudinal objects, does not constitute a norm for the modal object itself. That is, the
correctness of a modal object does not consist in its validity, and, as it was already
noted, it does not consist in its satisfaction either.
5 Partial truth, correctness, satisfaction, and validity
Truth and the more general notions of correctness and of satisfaction as well as the
related notion of validity permit partial application, resulting in notions of partial
truth in the sense of Yablo (2015), as well as partial correctness, partial satisfaction,
and partial validity (Moltmann 2017a). Linguistically, this is reflected in the use of
adverbials like partly modifying predicates of truth, correctness, satisfaction, and
validity in the examples below:
31 It may be tempting to view the existence statements in (33a, b) as ‘something-from-nothing inferences’
from modal sentences, introducing a pleonastic entity (Schiffer 2003). However, this would not account for
validity as the mode of being of the modal object, and it would fail to capture the modal object’s satisfaction
conditions, as well as the correctness of actions satisfying it.
32 Validity may also apply to products of declarative illocutionary acts:
(i) The declaration of war is still valid.
It may also apply to the abstract state that goes along with the declaration:
(ii) The state of war still obtains.
The abstract state is the obtaining of the declared condition at a particular time and space. See Moltmann
(2013b) for more on the notion of an abstract state.
Unlike the products of declarative illocutionary acts, abstract states can only ‘obtain’, but not be ‘valid’.
Existence for abstract states amounts to the obtaining of a condition at a particular location (when established
by acts of declaration).
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(37) a. John’s belief is partly true.
b. John’s claim is partly correct.
c. Mary’s desire was partly satisfied.
d. The offer was partly taken up.
e. The offer is now only partly valid.
Partly as a predicate modifier in (37) relates to the content-based part structure of an
attitudinal object. Thus, (37a)–(37e) are equivalent to (38a)–(38e):
(38) a. Part of John’s belief is true.
b. Part of John’s claim is correct.
c. Part of Mary’s desire was satisfied.
d. Part of the offer was taken up.
e. Only part of the offer is now valid.
Also agent-related predicates of satisfaction allow for partiality:
(39) a. John partly satisfied the demand.
b. John partly followed Mary’s advice.
The notion of partial satisfaction shows, again, the importance of distinguishing, in
terms of their ability of having violators, illocutionary products of the sort of orders
from those of the sort of offers. Partial (but not complete) fulfillment of an order
goes along with partial ignorance or violation of the order, whereas partial (but not
complete) taking up of an offer does not go along with any sort of violation. Failure
to fulfill part of an order is partly violating it, whereas failure of taking up part of an
offer is no violation of any sort.
Also modal objects allow for partial satisfaction:
(40) a. John partly fulfilled his obligation.
b. John partly followed the law/the rule.
Modal objects display a part structure based on partial content as well. When the part
of -construction applies to a modal object, it picks out a partial content (rather than the
temporal part of a state), as in the following examples33:
(41) a. Part of John’s obligation is to help Mary.
b. Part of the offer is to use the house in summer.
c. Part of the law concerns children.
Both satisfaction and validity of a modal object may be partial. The obligation for
Mary to work on weekends may be satisfied only partially, and it may obtain only
in part. An offer may hold only partially, and it may be taken up only in part. Both
validity and satisfaction thus require a notion of partial content for their bearers.
33 There are non-deontic modal objects that in a way display a part structure based on partial content.
These are entities of the sort of abilities, habits, implicit rules, and dispositions (Moltmann 2017a). With
them, part of picks out part of the constitutive conditions making up the modal objects (as in part of John’s
special ability, part of John’s habit). Of course, modal objects of the sort of abilities and habits cannot be
true or false or even satisfied or not satisfied, but they can be manifested and partly manifested. An activity
that is a partial manifestation of an ability is a manifestation of part of the ability.
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Partial validity cannot be reduced to partial truth. That is, the validity of part of a
modal object cannot be reduced to the partial truth of a statement of the modal object’s
validity. Thus (42a) is not equivalent to (42b) nor is (43a) to (43b):
(42) a. The students fulfilled part of the requirement.
b. That the students fulfilled the requirement is partly true.
(43) a. The police force ignored part of the order.
b. That the police force ignored the order is partly true.
(42a) cannot have a reading on which part of the students fulfilled the requirement,
but (42b) can have such a reading. Similarly, (43a) cannot have a reading on which
part of the police force ignored the order, but (43b) can have such a reading.
Truthmaker semantics provides a straightforward notion of partial content (Yablo
2015; Fine 2017b):
(44) For sets A and B of situations or actions, B is a partial content of A iff every
satisfier of A contains a satisfier of B and every satisfier of B is contained in a
satisfier of A.
The notion of a partial content of an attitudinal or modal object o can then be defined
as below, where sat(o) is the set of satisfiers of o34:
(45) A set B of situations or actions is a partial content of an attitudinal or modal
object o iff B is a partial content of sat(o).
With this notion of partial content, the two notions of partial satisfaction (truth) and
partial validity can be formulated as follows:
(46) a. An (attitudinal or modal) object o is partially satisfied (true) iff there is an
actual situation or action s and a partial content B of o such that s ∈ B.
b. A (potential) modal object o is partially valid if there is a partial content B
of o such that for some (potential) modal object d that is part of o, d is valid
(exists) and B  sat(d).
(46b) is a condition on potential modal objects, modal objects that may or may not
obtain or be valid. (46b) presupposes that for every partial content B of a potential
modal object o, there is a potential modal object that is part of o and has B as its
(complete) content.
34 One motivation for Fine’s (2017b, to appear a, b) notion of partial content is to account for the invalidity
of the inferences below (Ross’ paradox):
(i) Take an apple!
Take an apple or the gold!
Fine takes the consequence relation among imperatives as in (i) to be the relation of partial content,
defined as follows. Imperative B is a consequence of imperative A iff every satisfier of A contains a satisfier
of B and every satisfier of B is contained in a satisfier of A. Fine (to appear a, b) explains the invalidity of
the corresponding inference with deontic may in a somewhat similar way:
(ii) You may take an apple.
You may take an apple or the gold.
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6 Truth predicates and sentential subjects
We have seen that truth predicates and their variants—predicates of correctness, satis-
faction, and validity—apply to attitudinal and modal objects, entities that come with
essential representational and, to an extent, normative properties. However, this gen-
eralization was established on the basis of sentences with noun phrases as subjects.
The question, then, is how are truth predicates to be understood when they apply to
that-clauses as subjects, as below:
(47) That Berlin is the capital of Germany is true.
There are two important generalizations about truth predicates with sentential subjects
as in (47). First, the sentential-subject construction in (47) systematically alternates
with the extraposition construction, as below:
(48) It is true that Berlin is the capital of Germany.
This alternation in fact holds for all predicates that take sentential subjects. That is, all
predicates that take a clause as subject (is important, is likely, is nice, is known, was
discovered…) also allow for the clause to be extraposed, as in (48).
Second, sentential subjects generally can be replaced by special quantifiers and
pronouns such as something or that:
(49) a. Something is true.
b. That is true.
Quantifiers and pronouns like something and that are special in that they can take the
place of predicative, intensional, and other nonreferential complements. They are thus
not themselves indicators of the referentiality of the expression they may replace, but
instead may have a nominalizing function, introducing new objects into the semantic
structure of sentences that would not have been available otherwise (Moltmann 2003a,
2013a, 2017c).
The philosophical literature, as was mentioned, has mainly focused on truth predi-
cates with sentential subjects. This focus has given rise to particular views about the
notion of truth—in particular deflationism and minimalism—which are based on the
assumption that that-clauses are proposition-denoting nominalizations of sentences.
I will come to those views and the way they are challenged by the present perspective
in the next section.
Another view that the focus on true with sentences has given rise to is the view that
it is true that is primarily an operator or connective rather than is true being a predicate
applied to an object (Mulligan 2010). When considered a connective or operator, it is
true that would have no semantic contribution or at best would just serve to shift the
evaluation of the subsequent clause to a different time or circumstance. Linguistically,
this view, when applied to the actual linguistic form of it is true-sentences, is hard to
maintain. First of all, it is true that does not form a constituent; rather that and the
clause that follows that do. Moreover, the view gives priority to the extraposed form,
when in fact extraposition of sentential subjects is always available even for predicates
123
Synthese
like is nice and is hard to believe, which could hardly be considered ‘connectives’ or
‘operators’ (Moltmann 2015a). In fact, the availability of the extraposed form with
true does not specifically support true not acting as a predicate. There are predicates
that allow only for the extraposed form, for example seem and appear (it seems that S,
* That S seems, it appears that S, * That S appears), and the general explanation is that
those predicates select CPs (roughly, sentential arguments), whereas those that allow
for subject clauses select DPs (roughly, referential arguments) (Alrenga 2005). This
means that true actually selects a DP (a referential argument) rather than a sentential
argument (a that-clause), even if the embedded clause is extraposed. The that-clause,
which is a CP, will thus not act as a referential term standing for the object that true
applies to. Rather the DP, which is syntactically required in subject position, will do
so.
How then does the that-clause relate to the DP in subject position with the predicate
true? There are roughly two views in the literature about the syntactic position of the
apparent subject clause and its relation to the DP in subject position. On one view,
argued for by Koster (1978), the subject clause is in fact in topic position. This means
that it would just be linked to an empty nominal element eN in the subject position in
the structure below:
(50) [[That Paris is the capital of France]TOP [[eN]DP [is true]VP]]]CP
The topic position does not require a referential expression, but also allows for pred-
icates (such as really happy in Really happy he will never be). Only the empty DP
in subject position will refer to the object that true is predicated of. An empty DP in
subject position in general may stand for different sorts of objects, depending on the
type of object the predicate requires; the that-clause in topic position will just serve
to characterize the object’s content.
On another view, recently pursued by Kastner (2015), a subject clause will in fact
just be a part of the DP in subject position modifying an empty nominal eN , as below:
(51) [[eN that Paris is the capital of France]DP [is true]VP]CP
Such a DP construction would overtly be of the sort the claim that S, the fact that S,
or the proposition that S. On that view, again, the that-clause would have the semantic
role of just characterizing the object the entire DP stands for and that the predicate
will apply to, rather than acting as a referential term referring to it.
Without going into the details that motivate the two views and a comparison among
them, clearly on either view true with a that-clause requires a referential category
(DP) in subject position (unlike on either view, seems and appears). This means that
true should perform its ordinary semantic role as a predicate applying to an object
even when it applies to a that-clause.
What sort of object does the subject DP with is true stand for? It appears that true
with a that-clause does not apply to a proposition, but rather to an attitudinal object,
just like true with an overt DP (referential NP). More precisely, true with a that-clause
applies to a contextually given claim or suggestion whose content is given by the that-
clause. The semantic evidence comes from the applicability of the normative truth
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predicate correct to that-clauses. Correct, which was not applicable to propositions,
is unproblematic with that-clauses (in subject position and when extraposed), and
then, as with beliefs and claims, it conveys truth (and just truth):
(52) a. That John is the director is correct.
b. It is correct that John is the director.
As such, correct also permits modification by partly, requiring access to the partial
content of a truth-directed attitudinal object:
(53) That John is in charge is partly correct.
The syntactic and semantic arguments taken together make it implausible that that-
clauses with the predicate true stand for abstract propositions, the semantic values of
sentences. Rather they support the view that that-clauses with true as predicate serve
to characterize a claim, suggestion, or hypothesis to which the speaker refers with the
silent (or at least partly silent) DP in the subject position. This interpretation would
correspond to a syntactic structure in which the subject DP contains a silent head
noun for an assertive illocutionary product and the that-clause appears in or relates
to the position following the silent noun for the illocutionary product.35 Note that the
claim or suggestion referred to need not be an actual one: it may be a kind of claim
or suggestion, what could be referred to as ‘the claim that S’ or ‘the suggestion that
S’. Natural language permits reference to particular attitudinal objects (John’s claim
that S) just as it permits reference to kinds of attitudinal objects (the claim that S)
(Moltmann 2003b, 2013a, 2014, 2017c).
A final issue is how special quantifiers or pronouns like something or that as in
(49a, b) should be understood. Such quantifiers and pronouns are special in that they
can take the place of various nonreferential occurrences of expressions (predicative
and intensional complements of verbs, for example). They arguably act semantically
as nominalizing expressions and as such stand for attitudinal objects or kinds of them
35 There is a puzzle for this syntactic account of subject clauses, though, that still needs an explanation. This
is a difference between full DPs with a that-clause modifier and DPs with a silent head noun. That-clauses
in subject position are not referentially independent, unlike what the account would predict. That is, what
kind of entity a that-clause in subject position stands for depends strictly on the predicate. This is illustrated
in the understanding of the evaluative predicate nice below:
(i) a. That Mary got elected is nice.
b. The fact that Mary got elected is nice
Sentence (ia) allows only for a reading on which nice evaluates a fact, making it equivalent to (ib) even
though nice could in principle evaluate a proposition (as in the proposition that S is nice) or a possibility
(as in the possibility that S is nice).
Other predicates may apply only to possibilities, for example exclude. Thus (iia) can only be understood
as equivalent to (iib), even though there is a sense in which facts and claims can be excluded too:
(ii) a. That John might get elected is excluded.
b. The possibility that John might get elected is excluded.
Only in the presence of a suitable predicate can a that-clause in subject position stand for a contextually
given claim or suggestion, for example with true or correct. This means that with (apparent) subject clauses
the silent head noun of the subject DP cannot be freely chosen, unlike the overt head noun in the construction
the claim that S.
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when they occur with predicates that also take that-clauses (Moltmann 2003a, b,
2013a, 2017c).
7 Truth predicates in natural language and deflationist and minimalist
views of true
One central issue in the philosophical discussion of truth is the status of true as a
predicate expressing a property. The last section made clear that true syntactically and
semantically acts as a predicate even with that-clauses. Another issue is whether true
as a predicate expresses a property in any substantial sense or whether it better goes
along with a deflationist or minimalist account of some sort (Horwich 1990; Künne
2003). In what follows, I will argue that the overall view of truth and related notions
that is reflected in truth-related predicates in natural language is incompatible with a
deflationist or minimalist view of truth.
Deflationists and minimalists deny that true expresses a real property, but they do not
necessarily make claims about the syntactic status of true. Thus, Horwich’s (1990)
version of deflationism only maintains that what constitutes having the concept of
truth is the knowledge of the equivalence schema below, where [S] is a nominalization
function (roughly corresponding to the complementizer that)36:
(54) [(that) S] is true iff S.
As stated in (54), this deflationist view still makes some semantic assumptions, though.
First, it gives priority to the clausal construction. (54) is applicable only when true
applies to a that-clause and not when it applies to a referential NP. Moreover, (54)
treats a that-clause as a proposition-referring term. Given (54), the application of the
truth predicate amounts to the denominalization of the proposition-referring term (a
that-clause) and the use of the sentence thus obtained.
In addition, (54) could not be extended to the full range of truth-related predicates.
First of all, a schema like (54) could not apply to the normative predicate correct
conveying truth when applied to some objects, but not others. Correct does not even
apply to propositions, but only to entities like beliefs and assertions.
Moreover, (54) cannot be extended to predicates of satisfaction, which is particularly
problematic if predicates of satisfaction are considered predicates that include true as
a special case. For a schema like (54) to cover predicates of satisfaction, it would have
to apply to what amounts to the nominalization of an imperative, let’s say to a term for
a request. But the satisfaction of a request does not amount to the use of an imperative.
The latter serves to make a request, not to satisfy it. The deflationist account, moreover,
could not apply to agent-related satisfaction predicates.
There is also a general issue with what true is taken to apply to in (54). It is far
from clear that there is such a thing as a notion of an abstract proposition—a truth
bearer—that is not itself constituted by the notion of truth and the intentionality of
agents (Boghossian 2010). Truth is intimately linked to intentionality and the ability to
represent, on a par with satisfaction. Attitudinal objects as agent- and mind-dependent
objects reflect that link, abstract propositions don’t.




The aim of this paper was to show that a closer look at the semantic behavior of
truth predicates and their variants provides important insights into the notion of truth
and related notions. The core of natural language, the paper argued, reflects the view
that attitudinal objects are the bearers of truth or satisfaction conditions, rather than
propositions, as on the standard view. This holds even when truth predicates apply
to that-clauses. Furthermore, natural language displays a notion of truth that has the
status of a norm associated with certain types of representational objects, rather being
action-guiding. Finally, the different types of satisfaction predicates give support for a
truthmaker theory being associated with the notions of truth and satisfaction, as does
the possibility of partial truth, partial satisfaction, and partial validity.
If attitudinal objects rather than propositions act as the primary truth bearers, this
will raise the question of the semantics of attitude reports. On the standard view, attitude
reports like John believes that S involve propositions as the semantic values of that-
clauses, which will act as the relata of a two-place attitudinal relation (the relation of
believing). However, there are various linguistic and philosophical motivations for an
alternative view on which attitudinal objects, rather than propositions, play a central
role in the semantics of attitude reports.37
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